COMMENT
Anonymous Tips Alleging Drunk Driving: Why “One Free
Swerve” Is One Too Many
I. Introduction
Drunk driving has been referred to as many things, including selfish,
stupid, and arrogant.1 The very mention of the act no doubt incites many
people. Mothers Against Drunk Driving, a non-profit organization, was
even founded with the sole mission of ending drunk driving in America.2
This organization claims that one in three people in the United States will
be involved in an alcohol-related traffic accident in their lifetime.3 It is
probably a safe assumption that the majority of people who read this article
have been affected in some way by drunk driving, whether by being
personally involved in an accident with a drunk driver, a loved one being
involved in the same, or even having friends who routinely drive while over
the legal limit.
Drunk driving not only poses unique dangers, but also unique legal
issues. This is evidenced by the current split in authority regarding whether
an anonymous tip alleging drunk driving is sufficient constitutionally to
justify an investigative traffic stop without prior independent police
corroboration of the tip’s allegations. The majority of courts hold that a
responding officer is justified in conducting an investigative stop of the
driver alleged to be drunk in the anonymous tip without first independently
corroborating the tip’s allegation of illegality.4 The minority of courts,
1. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, Mayor Vows to Continue to Press D.W.I. Battle, N.Y.
TIMES, May 23, 2002, at B6; Jim, Comment to 4 Time DUI Sentence: Woman Gets Jail
Time, WOWT CHANNEL 6 (Jan. 26, 2011, 6:59PM), http://www.wowt.com/
home/headlines/4_Time_DUI_Sentence_114581064.html?storySection=comments; Monica
Dean, Police: Drunk Driving ‘Is Just Stupid’, NBC SAN DIEGO, Aug. 4, 2010, http://www.
nbcsandiego.com/news/local-beat/Police-Drunk-Driving-Is-Just-Stupid-99 954129.html.
2. See History of the Mission Statement, MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING,
http://www.madd.org/about-us/mission (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
3. Statistics, MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, http://www.madd.org/statistics/ (last
visited Apr. 15, 2011) (citing NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF
TRANSP., THE TRAFFIC STOP AND YOU: IMPROVING COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN CITIZENS
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT (Mar. 2001)).
4. See United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2001); People v. Wells, 136 P.3d
810 (Cal. 2006); Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212 (Del. 2004); State v. Prendergast, 83
P.3d 714 (Haw. 2004); State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625 (Iowa 2001); State v. Crawford,
67 P.3d 115 (Kan. 2003); State v. Golotta, 837 A.2d 359 (N.J. 2003); State v. Scholl, 684
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however, hold that an investigative traffic stop based solely upon an
anonymous tip alleging drunk driving is an unconstitutional seizure under
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.5
Legislatures6 and courts alike have taken an overt stance against drunk
driving, and it shows in the statistics. In 2009, close to 11,000 fatalities in
the United States were caused by alcohol-impaired driving.7 This number
is less than half of what it was in the early 1980s.8 Nevertheless, there is
still more that can be done to continue to reduce the number of lives lost
because of drunk driving. In dissent from the denial of certiorari of a recent
petition to the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts stated:
The effect of the [minority position] will be to grant drunk
drivers “one free swerve” before they can legally be pulled over
by police. It will be difficult for an officer to explain to the
family of a motorist killed by that swerve that the police had a
tip that the driver of the other car was drunk, but that they were
powerless to pull him over, even for a quick check.9

N.W.2d 83 (S.D. 2004); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862 (Vt. 2000); State v. Rutzinski, 623
N.W.2d 516 (Wis. 2001).
5. See State v. Sparen, No. CR00258199S, 2001 WL 206078 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001);
Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d 288 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000); State v. Miller, 510
N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1994); Hall v. State, 74 S.W.3d 521 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002); Harris v.
Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 2008); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071 (Wyo.
1999).
6. See, e.g., Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990) (dealing with
a state law establishing sobriety checkpoints designed to mete out and remove drunk drivers
from public roads); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559 (1983) (dealing with a state
implied consent law providing for the summary suspension of a person’s driver’s license
upon arrest for drunk driving if the person refuses to submit to a blood alcohol test); see also
Administrative License Revocation, MOTHERS AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, http://www.
madd.org/laws/administrative-license-revocation.html (listing the states that have implied
consent laws that provide for the summary suspension of driver’s licenses upon arrest for
drunk driving suspicion) (last visited Apr. 15, 2012); Sobriety Checkpoints, MOTHERS
AGAINST DRUNK DRIVING, http://www.madd.org/laws/sobriety-checkpoints.html (listing the
states that have sobriety checkpoint laws) (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
7. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOT HS 811385 Traffic Safety Facts, 1 tbl.1 (2009), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/ncsa/
pdf/2010/811385.pdf.
8. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., Traffic Safety
Facts 1993: Alcohol, 1 (1993), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/93
Alcohol.pdf.
9. Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 12 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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The majority position also has its problems. The Fourth Amendment is a
powerful protector of individual privacy from arbitrary invasion,10 and the
majority of courts advocate crafting a blanket exception to this important
individual right. This comment examines both sides of this thus far
unresolved issue. In particular, it argues that while Fourth Amendment
privacy is important and should be treated as such, in the majority of cases,
the anonymous tip alleging drunk driving is reliable enough to render an
investigative stop based solely on that tip reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. This is because of several key factors typically present in the
drunk driving situation that make the anonymous tip alleging drunk driving
sufficiently reliable to arouse reasonable suspicion on the part of
responding officers.
Part II of this comment examines the history of the Fourth Amendment
search and seizure clause, including relevant Supreme Court cases. In
addition, it gives a brief synopsis of Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and
Oklahoma court decisions regarding anonymous tips. Part III examines the
rationale behind both majority and minority holdings in the split, including
a look at Oklahoma’s position. Part IV argues that although the majority
position’s reasoning is flawed, the bulk of investigative stops based solely
upon anonymous tips alleging drunk driving are reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. Part V concludes.
II. History of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.11
Dissenting in Brinegar v. United States, Justice Jackson stated that the
rights given in this amendment should be categorized as indispensable
freedoms.12 This is because “[u]ncontrolled search and seizure is one of the
first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every arbitrary

10. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
12. 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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government.”13 Justice Jackson went further to say that a people’s dignity,
personality, and self-reliance can cease to exist when they are subjected to
unchecked police power in the form of search and seizure.14 Thus, the
Fourth Amendment protects against government officials arbitrarily
intruding upon individual privacy and security.15 As with several other
constitutional provisions, it applies to the States by way of incorporation
into the Fourteenth Amendment.16
Historically, in ruling on Fourth Amendment cases where criminal
activity was not observed firsthand, the Court has typically required the
police to obtain judicial assent through the warrant procedure prior to
searching or seizing.17 This procedure requires a showing of probable
cause, where an impartial decision maker determines whether there is a
reasonable belief that what is sought will be found in a particular place.18
The limited exceptions to complying with this warrant requirement include
hot pursuit19 and searches incidental to lawful arrests20—including searches
of things under the immediate control of the person arrested21—and, in
certain instances, searches of the place where the person is arrested.22
Another exception to the warrant requirement is that law enforcement can
make a brief investigative stop of an automobile if the officer has probable
cause to believe searching the vehicle will provide evidence of a crime.23
13. Id.
14. Id. at 180-81; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (quoting Union Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (“No right is held more sacred . . . than the right
of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or
interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”)).
15. Camara, 387 U.S. at 528.
16. Id. (citing Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963)).
17. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967); Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89, 96 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 477, 479, 480-81 (1963);
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 49798, 500 (1958).
18. 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and Seizures § 191 (2010).
19. Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967) (“The Fourth
Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation if to do
so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others.”).
20. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964) (citing Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20, 30 (1946); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914)).
21. Preston, 376 U.S. at 367 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925)).
22. Id. (citing United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61-62 (1950)); Marron v.
United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199 (1927); Agnello, 269 U.S. at 30.
23. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153;
United States v. Williams, 827 F. Supp. 641, 645 (D. Or. 1993).
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Although an investigative traffic stop is a seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment,24 an exception was carved out due to a combination of
the impracticalities of obtaining a warrant to search a mobile vehicle—
something that can disappear before a warrant can be attained and search
lawfully done—and the fact that there is a decreased expectation in privacy
associated with automobiles.25 This was the state of the Supreme Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence until Terry v. Ohio.26
A. Terry v. Ohio
In Terry, the Court considered a class of police conduct that it had not
previously ruled upon in terms of Fourth Amendment constitutionality—
prompt police action based upon surveillance of an officer on patrol.27 In
ruling on the constitutionality of this branch of police conduct, the Court
decided that when a police officer reasonably determines that criminal acts
may be taking place, and where, in making initial inquiries the officer’s
suspicion is not quelled, he or she may conduct a careful, limited search of
the suspicious person.28 In other words, reasonable suspicion can lead to a
constitutionally justifiable investigative stop under the Fourth
Amendment.29 This was a major divergence from the warrant requirement
and per se unreasonable search presumption for those searches that were
not accompanied with a warrant.30 Under Terry, officers can not only
search without a warrant in certain situations, but also search based upon a
lower standard than probable cause—the reasonable suspicion standard.31
These stops are now commonly known as Terry stops.32
24. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
25. Carney, 471 U.S. at 392-93; 68 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 18, § 192.
26. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
27. Id. at 20.
28. Id. at 30.
29. Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Terry, 392
U.S. at 22).
30. Compare Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963) (holding that an
officer’s acting on an informant’s vague tip would subvert the principle that “[t]he arrest
warrant procedure serves to insure that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer
will be interposed between the citizen and the police, to assess the weight and credibility of
the information which the complaining officer adduces as probable cause”), and Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925) (stating that “[warrantless] searches are held unlawful
notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause”), with Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
31. See, e.g., Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990); United States v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972).
32. See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270-71 (2000); White, 496 U.S. at 328-29;
Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7.
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Following Terry, an issue developed regarding the circumstances where
a tip from an informant could give rise to a constitutionally justifiable
police seizure.33 The Court first addressed the issue of whether an
anonymous tip could give police reasonable suspicion in order to initiate a
Terry stop in the 1990 case of Alabama v. White.
B. Alabama v. White
In Alabama v. White, the issue before the Court was whether an
anonymous telephone tip, somewhat corroborated by the police, provided a
degree of reliability sufficient to give reasonable suspicion to justify an
investigate stop.34 The anonymous tip alleged that a woman would be
leaving her apartment at a certain time, in a certain car, going to a particular
place, and that she would be in possession of illegal drugs located inside of
a brown briefcase.35 Before ultimately ruling that the information contained
in the anonymous tip was sufficient under the Fourth Amendment to
support reasonable suspicion, the Court looked at previous decisions
involving tips to the police.36 The Court relied upon, inter alia, Illinois v.
Gates, where it clarified the standard for evaluating when anonymous tips
support probable cause.37
In Gates, the Court abandoned an old approach to determining whether
probable cause was supported by an anonymous tip,38 and instead adopted a
totality of the circumstances approach.39 But the Court in Gates was careful
to note that the critical factors it laid out under the older approach for
making the probable cause determination—veracity, reliability, and basis of
knowledge of the informant—were still highly relevant.40 The Court then
noted that these same factors were applicable in the reasonable suspicion
context; although, because of its nature, a lesser showing of the factors
would meet the lower reasonable suspicion standard.41

33. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 227 (1983) (considering whether an
anonymous letter could give rise to probable cause in order to obtain a warrant); Adams, 407
U.S. at 147 (sustaining a Terry stop initiated based on a known informant’s tip that was
given in person).
34. 496 U.S. at 326-27.
35. Id. at 327.
36. Id. at 329-31.
37. Id. at 328 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 227).
38. Id. at 328.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 230).
41. Id. at 328-29.
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Relying on the language and rationale behind Gates, the Court in
Alabama v. White established the test for whether an anonymous tip granted
reasonable suspicion to police officers sufficient to justify a Terry stop.42
Although acknowledging that the Court had previously stated in Gates that
a bare-bones anonymous tip rarely demonstrates the informant’s veracity or
basis of knowledge, the Court in White stated that an anonymous caller
could provide the police with reasonable suspicion when the tip was
sufficiently corroborated by a law enforcement officer prior to performing
an investigative stop.43 The Court then proceeded to explain how it could
be determined whether anonymous tips gave rise to reasonable suspicion.44
It started out by noting that:
[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than
probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion
can be established with information that is different in quantity
or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also
in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information
that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.45
The Court then explained the totality of the circumstances approach for
determining whether reasonable suspicion existed.46 The two main factors
are (1) the quantity of information that is passed on to police, and (2) the
degree of reliability possessed by the information:47 “[I]f a tip has a
relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to
establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the
tip were more reliable.”48 This obviously implies the opposite is just as
true—if a tip is more reliable, less information is required to establish
reasonable suspicion.
It is important to note that the Court found the tip in White to be
sufficiently corroborated by the police prior to the investigative stop.49 The
only thing the police corroborated prior to conducting the stop, however,
seemed to be an instantaneous confirmation of the anonymous tip’s

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See id. at 328-31.
Id. at 329, 331 (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 237).
See id. at 330-31.
Id. at 330.
See id. at 330-31.
Id. at 330.
Id.
Id. at 331.
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descriptive information.50 Although acknowledging that White was a close
case,51 the majority placed great emphasis on the fact that the anonymous
tip included some predictive element to it.52 The tip at issue gave an
accurate description of White’s vehicle, an accurate time frame for White’s
departure from the apartment building, and also provided some
corroboration for her destination.53 Based upon this, the Court considered it
reasonable to believe that a tipster’s accurate description of an individual’s
plans indicates the likelihood that the tipster also has access to trustworthy
information about that individual’s criminal activities.54
After Terry and its significant lowering of the standard required of police
in order to necessitate a seizure, White went a step further by allowing
searches based on tips that would likely not have been allowed prior to the
case. In upholding the investigative stop in White even though the tip “was
largely uncorroborated, [the Court assured] that in the future virtually all
tips [would] serve as an adequate justification for intrusive stops by the
police.”55 This was so because the Court basically stated that law
enforcement could find reasonable suspicion based on anonymous tips
merely by corroborating the easily visible content of the tips themselves—
the description of the car driven by the accused, its general direction, etc.
After the decision was handed down, lower courts began using the
rationale behind White to uphold Terry stops when police were using
anonymous tips and only corroborating descriptive details given in these
tips before initiating a search and seizure.56 Two major exceptions that
many courts agreed upon were those when an anonymous tipster either
alleged that a person illegally possessed a firearm57 or that a person was
50. Christopher L. Kottke, Alabama v. White: The Constitutionality of Anonymous
Telephone Tips in Support of “Reasonably Suspicion” and the Narrowing of Fourth
Amendment Protections, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 603, 620 (1991) (discussing the effect of
the White decision on Fourth Amendment protections).
51. White, 496 U.S. at 332.
52. See id. at 331-32.
53. Joe Metcalfe, Anonymous Tips, Investigative Stops and Inarticulate Hunches—
Alabama v. White, 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990), 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 219, 227 (1991).
54. White, 496 U.S. at 332.
55. Metcalfe, supra note 53, at 220.
56. See United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 727 (8th Cir. 2001); Jon A. York, Search
and Seizure: Law Enforcement Officer’s Ability to Conduct Investigative Traffic Stops Based
Upon an Anonymous Tip Alleging Dangerous Driving When the Officers Do Not Personally
Observe Any Traffic Violations, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 173, 182 (2003) (discussing the effect
of the White decision).
57. See, e.g., United States v. DeBerry, 76 F.3d 84, 885-87 (7th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Gibson, 64 F.3d 617, 619-25 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Bold, 19 F.3d 99,
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driving in a drunk or erratic fashion.58 When Florida v. J.L. came up, the
Court took the opportunity to cabin the reasonable suspicion standard in the
context of anonymous tips.
C. Florida v. J.L.
In Florida v. J.L., the Court was asked to determine whether an
anonymous tip asserting nothing more than that a person was carrying a gun
was sufficient to give rise to a Terry stop based on reasonable suspicion.59
The pertinent facts are these: (1) an anonymous caller reported that “a
young black male standing at a particular bus stop and wearing a plaid shirt
was carrying a gun;”60 (2) officers responded soon thereafter, and saw three
black males hanging out at the named bus stop;61 and (3) although there was
no other reason for suspicion besides the vague tip, the officers frisked the
young man wearing a shirt matching the tip’s description and found a gun
on him.62
In making its decision as to whether the responding officers had
reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop and frisk, the Court primarily
focused on the fact that the tip contained nothing that was not readily
observable by an uninformed bystander.63 The Court reasoned that without
predictive information in an anonymous tip, the police have no means with
which to test the informant’s knowledge or credibility.64 The Court
arguably carried on the reasoning seen in Alabama v. White; however, it
gave teeth to the predictive element that the White majority so heavily
emphasized. In doing this, the Court stated that “reasonable suspicion . . .
requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its
tendency to identify a determinate person.”65 As opposed to the White
decision, where the Court reasoned that the corroboration of an anonymous
tip which helped the police ensure they were stopping the determinate
102-04 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Clipper, 973 F.2d 944, 946-51 (D.C. Cir. 1992),
abrogated by United States v. Clipper, 313 F.3d 605 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
58. See, e.g., State v. Slater, 986 P.2d 1038, 1041-46 (Kan. 1999); State v. Sampson,
669 A.2d 1326, 1327 (Me. 1996); State v. Melanson, 665 A.2d 338, 339-41 (N.H. 1995);
State v. Lamb, 720 A.2d 1101, 1102-06 (Vt. 1998).
59. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 269-72.
64. Id. at 271.
65. Id. at 272 (citing 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.4(h) (3d ed.
1996)).
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person accused in the tip passed Fourth Amendment muster, the J.L. Court
took the predictive element a step further in requiring that the tip also “be
reliable in its assertion of illegality.”66
In concurrence, Justice Kennedy stated that the fact that an informant’s
identity is unknown means that the informant is not putting his or her
credibility on the line, and thus could lie with impunity.67 In calling in
anonymously, Justice Kennedy reasoned, the informant does not subject
himself or herself to ramifications if the informant provides law
enforcement with false information.68 Further, without providing the
predictive information so heavily focused upon in the J.L. opinion, the court
is left without a means to judge the informant’s credibility, and thus the risk
of false allegations becomes unacceptable.69
The Court also declined to carve out a firearm exception from the Terry
analysis.70 In declining to do so, the Court stated that this would go too
far—an anonymous call could be made in order to harass a person.71
In determining that a firearm exception would be contrary to the intent of
the Fourth Amendment, the Court, in dicta, made a few important
statements relevant to the development of this comment:
The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the
circumstances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous
tip might be so great as to justify a search even without a
showing of reliability. We do not say, for example, that a report
of a person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability
we demand for a report of a person carrying a firearm before the
police can constitutionally conduct a frisk.72
The Court also implied that searches of locales that possess a lower
expectation of Fourth Amendment privacy might be justifiable based upon
information that would be insufficient to justify searches in other
66. Compare Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990), with J.L., 529 U.S. at 272
(citing LAFAVE, supra note 65).
67. J.L., 529 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
68. See Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141, 146 (Va. 2008) (explaining the effect
of the implications of Kennedy concurrence).
69. J.L., 529 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 146
(providing information that is available to any observer increases the likelihood that the tip
could come from anyone ranging from “a concerned citizen, prankster, or someone with a
grudge against [the alleged drunk driver]”).
70. J.L., 529 U.S. at 272.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 273-74.
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locations.73 By stating this, the Court left open the possibility that other
factual situations, besides one where an anonymous tip alleged the illegal
possession of a firearm, could be weighted so heavily in favor of the
concern for public safety that the indicia of reliability required of an
anonymous tip could be substantially lowered. Many courts have focused
on this language in determining whether an anonymous tip alleging drunk
driving is sufficient to satisfy a Terry analysis.74
D. Tenth Circuit and Oklahoma Courts’ Anonymous Tip Precedent
Although both the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and Oklahoma courts
have only considered whether anonymous tips give rise to reasonable
suspicion a few times, the jurisdictions have largely mirrored what the
Supreme Court has done.75 The 1982 case of Lunsford v. State illustrates
how Oklahoma courts addressed whether an anonymous tip was supported
by reasonable suspicion prior to both Alabama v. White and Florida v.
J.L.76 In Lunsford, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that an
investigative stop conducted solely on information provided by two
unknown informants, where the officer knew nothing concerning the two
informants’ reliability or identity, and where the officer did not
independently corroborate the information in the anonymous tip prior to
performing the stop, was not constitutionally justifiable under the Fourth
Amendment.77
In United States v. Hinojos, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was
faced with the question of whether a police officer’s detainment and
questioning of a man who was alleged to be involved in drug trafficking by
an anonymous tipster was constitutionally permissible.78 The anonymous
tip included the number of occupants (two males), its point of departure
(Odessa, Texas), and time, plus its direction of travel (east on Turner
Turnpike).79

73. Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 11 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting J.L.,
529 U.S. at 274).
74. See, e.g., United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 736-37 (8th Cir. 2001); State v.
Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 629-30 (Iowa 2001); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 867 (Vt.
2000).
75. See generally United States v. Hinojos, 107 F.3d 765 (10th Cir. 1997); Nilsen v.
State, 203 P.3d 189 (Okla. Crim. App. 2009).
76. See generally Lunsford v. State, 652 P.2d 1243 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982).
77. Id. at 1245-46.
78. Hinojos, 107 F.3d at 767.
79. Id.
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Since this case arose prior to Florida v. J.L., the Tenth Circuit relied
heavily on Alabama v. White in its opinion.80 The court noted that the
anonymous tip in Hinojos was very similar to that in White.81 Further, the
court stated that even if the anonymous tip alone would not have given rise
to reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the officer’s actions, the
officer’s corroboration of the truck’s description, along with the fact that
Hinojos was driving on the highway and in the direction predicted, rendered
the investigative stop constitutionally justifiable.82
Finally, in a post-Florida v. J.L. decision, the Tenth Circuit considered
whether an anonymous tip gave rise to reasonable suspicion sufficient to
justify an investigative stop that turned up the illegal possession of a
firearm and ammunition in United States v. Copening.83 In stating that the
stop was constitutionally justifiable, the court distinguished Copening from
J.L. in several ways.84 First, the anonymous tipster used an unblocked
telephone number when he called 911.85 The court found that this mitigated
the threat of a tip designed to harass the person alleged to be in possession
of the firearm.86 Second, the anonymous tipster specifically insisted he had
“firsthand knowledge of the alleged conduct.”87 Third, the tip included a
detailed description of the car the accused was driving and what the tipster
had seen, which further bolstered the tip’s reliability.88 Fourth, the Tenth
Circuit remarked that the tipster’s multiple 911 calls, following of the
vehicle, and continual updating of the vehicle’s location to the 911
dispatcher, “be[spoke] an ordinary citizen acting in good faith.”89
Essentially, the court found these facts to further prove that the anonymous
tipster was not trying to harass or provide police with a phony tip.90
Finally, the officer sufficiently corroborated the tip by ensuring that it was
based on firsthand knowledge when he followed the vehicle for a while,
according to the tip’s instruction, prior to conducting the investigative
stop.91
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

See generally id.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 768-69.
United States v. Copening, 506 F.3d 1241, 1242-43 (10th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1243, 1246-47.
Id. at 1247.
Id.
Id. (quoting United States v. Brown, 496 F.3d 1070, 1076 (10th Cir. 2007)).
Id. (citing United States v. Jenkins, 313 F.3d 549, 554-55 (10th Cir. 2002)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Although the Tenth Circuit ruled this way in Copening, it stressed that its
ruling was purely fact-driven, and that because the anonymous-informant
context requires “significant ‘skepticism and careful scrutiny,’”92 it was not
carving out a blanket exception that anonymous tips always give rise to
reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify investigative stops under the
Fourth Amendment.93
III. Split in Authority
Whether the Fourth Amendment allows police officers to conduct
investigative stops based on anonymous tips alleging drunk driving is a
pressing question that the Supreme Court has not yet addressed, and it has
“deeply divided federal and state courts.”94 While some of the Court’s
decisions allow law enforcement to perform investigative stops based upon
reasonable suspicion,95 J.L. cabined the ability of law enforcement officers
to act based on anonymous tips alone because, absent independent
corroboration, anonymous tips were held typically to lack the indicia of
reliability required to justify investigative stops based on reasonable
suspicion.96 Nevertheless, the Court in J.L. did leave open the possibility
that the Fourth Amendment might require less in cases of greater danger.97
The Court also stated that searches of places that possess a lower
expectation of Fourth Amendment privacy than that of the physical person
might be permissible based on lesser reliability.98
Many lower courts, including the only federal circuit court to consider
the issue,99 have placed great weight on this language in holding that stops
based on nothing more than anonymous tips are justifiable under the Fourth
Amendment.100 Although this is the majority view, a significant minority
92. Id. at 1247 (quoting Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1449 (10th Cir.
1985)).
93. Id. at 1247-48.
94. Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 10 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
95. Id. (citing United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2001); People v. Wells,
136 P.3d 810 (Cal. 2006); Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212 (Del. 2004); State v.
Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714 (Haw. 2004); State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625 (Iowa 2001);
State v. Crawford, 67 P.3d 115 (Kan. 2003); State v. Golotta, 837 A.2d 359 (N.J. 2003);
State v. Scholl, 684 N.W.2d 83 (S.D. 2004); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862 (Vt. 2000); State
v. Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516 (Wis. 2001).
96. Harris, 130 S. Ct. at 10 (citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000)).
97. See id. at 11 (citing J.L., 529 U.S. at 273).
98. Id. at 10 (quoting J.L., 529 U.S. at 274).
99. See generally Wheat, 278 F.3d 722.
100. See, e.g., id. at 736-37; Walshire, 634 N.W.2d at 630; Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867.
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of courts have held the exact opposite and found that these stops are
unconstitutional because they are an unnecessary intrusion on a person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy.101 It is this split in authority that must be
further considered in order fully to understand the complexity of the issue
that the Supreme Court has thus far failed to resolve.102
In considering the rationale behind either allowing or prohibiting these
stops, keep in mind that a typical factual situation is as follows: (1) the
informant that reports the alleged drunk driving does not generally provide
his or her name;103 (2) the tip usually includes only descriptive information
of the car, such as the make and color, at least a partial license plate, a
general location of the vehicle’s whereabouts, and is commonly
accompanied by a conclusory statement as to the car’s being driven
erratically;104 and (3) the responding officer does not independently
101. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d 288 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000);
Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 2008); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071
(Wyo. 1999).
102. See Harris, 130 S. Ct. at 10 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“This is an important
question that is not answered by our past decisions, and that has deeply divided federal and
state courts.”).
103. Compare, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d at 724, 737 (allowing the stop even though the
caller did not identify himself), People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 811, 816 (Cal. 2006)
(allowing the stop even though “[t]he record is silent as to the identity of the caller . . . .”),
Walshire, 634 N.W.2d at 626, 630 (allowing the stop even though “the caller would not give
a name”), and Boyea, 765 A.2d at 863, 868 (holding the stop to be constitutionally
justifiable in a case involving an anonymous report), with Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d at 290,
293 (holding a stop to be unconstitutional when tip concerning erratic truck driving was
made by unidentified motorist), Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 144, 147 (disallowing the stop when
tipster was anonymous), and McChesney 988 P.2d at 1073, 1078 (holding a stop based on an
anonymous tip to be unconstitutional).
104. Compare, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d at 724, 737 (permitting the stop when the tip stated
that “[a] tan-and cream-colored Nissan Stanza . . . whose license plate began with the letters
W-O-C, was being driven erratically in the northbound lane of Highway 169 . . .” and
complaining “that the Nissan was passing on the wrong side of the road, cutting off other
cars, and otherwise being driven as if by a ‘complete maniac’”), State v. Scholl, 684 N.W.2d
83, 84, 90 (permitting the stop when “[t]he informant gave the license plate number of the
vehicle . . . described the vehicle as a blue Toyota Tacoma pickup . . .” and that the
informant had seen the driver “leaving Scarlet O’Hara’s bar stumbling pretty badly . . .”),
and Boyea, 765 A.2d at 863, 868 (permitting a stop based on a tip that a “blue-purple
Volkswagen Jetta with New York plates, traveling south on I-89 in between Exits 10 and 11,
[was] operating erratically”), with Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d at 290, 293 (holding
unconstitutional a stop based on a tip that stated that “a pickup truck with Massachusetts
license plate number D34-314 was traveling on the wrong side of Route 195 in the vicinity
of Route 140 in New Bedford” and that “the truck had slowed down, crossed the grassy
median strip, and then proceeded onto the correct side of the highway”), Harris, 668 S.E.2d
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corroborate anything other than the descriptive details located in the
anonymous tip before conducting an investigative stop.105
A. Courts That Hold These Stops to Be Constitutionally Justifiable
As previously stated, the majority of courts that have considered this
issue have upheld these stops as constitutionally justifiable.106 According to
Chief Justice Roberts, in dissent from the denial of certiorari from a recent
case petitioned to the Court, these courts have upheld these stops based on
some combination of four reasons:
(1) the especially grave and imminent dangers posed by drunk
driving; (2) the enhanced reliability of tips alleging illegal
activity in public, to which the tipster was presumably an
at 147 (holding unconstitutional a stop based on a tip that stated that “there was a[n]
intoxicated driver in the 3400 block of Meadowbridge Road, [who] was named Joseph
Harris, and he was driving [a green] Altima, headed south, towards the city, possibly
towards the south side”), and McChesney, 988 P.2d at 1073, 1078 (holding unconstitutional
a stop based a tip that stated that “a red Mercury with temporary plates was weaving
between lanes, passing cars, and slowing down in order to pass them again” and that the car
“was traveling east on Interstate 90 twenty-five miles west of Gillette”).
105. Compare, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d at 724-25, 737 (upholding a stop in which the
officer matched the makes and partial license plate number given in an anonymous tip
“without having observed any incidents of erratic driving”), Walshire, 634 N.W.2d at 626,
630 (upholding a stop when “[t]he arresting officer located the car and stopped it, solely on
the basis of the call; he did not personally observe any behavior that would generate
reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop”), and Boyea, 765 A.2d at 863, 868 (“This was not an
officer seeking independent verification that a driver was intoxicated, but rather one intent
upon catching and stopping as soon as practically possible a driver whom he already
suspected of being under the influence.”), with Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d at 290, 293 (holding
the stop unconstitutional when “[the arresting officer] made the stop of the truck as a result
of the unidentified motorist’s report, and not because of any observations he made
concerning the operation of the vehicle”), Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 146, 147 (holding the stop
unconstitutional when the officer, during the hearing suppression, “did not describe Harris’
driving as erratic” before he acted on the anonymous tip and conducted a stop), and
McChesney, 988 P.2d at 1073-74, 1078 (holding unconstitutional the stop when “[d]uring
the time [the officer followed the alleged drunk driver, the officer] did not observe any
erratic driving or any violations of the law,” yet he still conducted an investigative stop
based upon the tip).
106. See Wheat, 278 F.3d 722; People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810 (Cal. 2006); Bloomingdale
v. State, 842 A.2d 1212 (Del. 2004); State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714 (Haw. 2004); People
v. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d 359 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625; State v.
Crawford, 67 P.3d 115 (Kan. 2003); State v. Golotta, 837 A.2d 359 (N.J. 2003); Scholl, 684
N.W.2d 83; State v. Hanning, 296 S.W.3d 44 (Tenn. 2009); Boyea, 765 A.2d 862; State v.
Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516 (Wis. 2001).
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eyewitness; (3) the fact that traffic stops are typically less
invasive than searches or seizures of individuals on foot; and (4)
the diminished expectation of privacy enjoyed by individuals
driving their cars on public roads.107
1. Drunk Driving and Its Unique Dangers
The reason most heavily focused upon by courts adhering to the majority
view is the fact that drunk driving poses a significant risk to the public.
Virtually every court holding these stops to be constitutional has been
persuaded by the dangers surrounding drunk driving.108 The only time a
federal appellate court has considered the issue was in United States v.
Wheat.109 In its analysis, the Eighth Circuit distinguished the situation of an
anonymous tip alleging a person driving drunk from that in J.L., because
“[i]n contrast to the report of an individual in possession of a gun, an
anonymous report of an erratic or drunk driver on the highway presents a
qualitatively different level of danger, and concomitantly greater urgency
for prompt action.”110
To go along with the increased level of danger associated with
anonymous tips alleging drunk driving, the Eighth Circuit noted a critical
distinction between cases where a person is alleged to possess a gun (like
the situation in J.L.) and those where a person is alleged to be driving
drunk.111 Officers have less invasive choices at their disposal in alleged
possessory offense cases.112 In alleged possessory offense cases, officers
can either “initiate a simple consensual encounter, for which no articulable
suspicion is required,”113 or officers can watch a person alleged to be
illegally possessing a firearm, essentially looking for suspicious activity
that would give rise to reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be
afoot, as was done in Terry.114
Since police officers do not have these less invasive options at their
disposal with alleged drunk drivers, they only have two choices. An officer
107. Harris, 130 S. Ct. at 11-12 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
108. See Wheat, 278 F.3d 722; Wells, 136 P.3d 810; Bloomingdale, 842 A.2d 1212;
Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714; Shafer, 868 N.E.2d 359; Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625; Crawford,
67 P.3d 115; Golotta, 837 A.2d 359; Scholl, 684 N.W.2d 83; Hanning, 296 S.W.3d 44;
Boyea, 765 A.2d 86; Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516.
109. See 278 F.3d 722.
110. Id. at 729 (quoting Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867).
111. See id. at 736-37.
112. Id. at 736.
113. Id. (citing Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1984) (per curiam)).
114. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1968)).

2012]

COMMENT

775

can either stop the automobile immediately to check if the driver is
operating under the influence of alcohol, or that officer can sit back and
watch the driver.115 If the officer elects to sit back and watch the driver,
this will inevitably lead to three possible outcomes: (1) the alleged drunk
driver continues harmlessly down the road for several miles, and the officer
stops his surveillance and leaves the driver alone; (2) the alleged drunk
driver weaves onto the shoulder, injuring nobody and corroborating the
anonymous tip; or (3) the alleged drunk driver swerves into oncoming
traffic, runs a stop light, or otherwise causes extreme harm in a traffic
accident.116
In referencing the dicta from J.L., several courts have gone so far as to
liken drunk drivers to mobile bombs.117 Even those that have not reached
for this analogy have either directly stated or insinuated that drunk driving
poses a much greater level of danger than a person illegally possessing a
firearm and that, therefore, drunk driving probably falls into what is
commonly known as the “public safety exception” found in the J.L. dicta.118
Regardless of whether these courts have likened drunk drivers to mobile
bombs, or stated or insinuated that drunk drivers pose such a level of danger
as to meet the public safety exception found in the J.L. dicta, virtually all
courts finding that these stops are constitutionally justifiable have held that
drunk driving poses such an imminent level of danger that it is in the best
interest of both the general public and the alleged drunk driver that these
stops be allowed.119 This way, a police officer can make a quick check,
rather than being powerless to pull over an alleged drunk driver, essentially
giving the driver “one free swerve.”120

115. Id. (citing Boyea, 765 A.2d at 862).
116. Id. at 736-37.
117. See, e.g., id. at 737 (quoting Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867 (“[A] drunk driver is not at all
unlike a ‘bomb,’ and a mobile one at that.”)); State v. Crawford, 67 P.3d 115, 118 (Kan.
2003) (quoting State v. Slater, 986 P.2d 1038, 1046 (Kan. 1999) (“A motor vehicle in the
hands of a drunken driver is an instrument of death. It is deadly, it threatens the safety of the
public, and that threat must be eliminated as quickly as possible.”)); State v. Golotta, 837
A.2d 359, 372 (N.J. 2003) (quoting State v. Tischio, 527 A.2d 388, 396 (N.J. 1987) (“We
find the bomb example [in the J.L. dicta] to be particularly apt because, . . . this Court
previously has described intoxicated motorists as ‘moving time bombs.’”)).
118. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2000).
119. See Virginia v. Harris, 130 S. Ct. 10, 12 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
120. Id.
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2. Increased Reliability of Anonymous Tips
Another factor that many courts have found to be in favor of allowing
these stops is that the great majority of tips come from eyewitnesses to the
erratic driving and are thus considered to be more reliable than tips alleging
concealed criminal activity.121 Courts have held that the risk of an
anonymous caller falsely reporting a person’s driving drunk is significantly
lower when the caller is viewing the erratic driving. In considering the
increased reliability of anonymous tips in the context of drunk driving, the
Eighth Circuit in Wheat stated:
[A] careful reading of the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence suggests that this emphasis on the predictive
aspects of an anonymous tip [as seen in Florida v. J.L.] may be
less applicable to tips purporting to describe contemporaneous,
readily observable criminal actions, as in the case of erratic
driving witnessed by another motorist.122
Further, the Eighth Circuit noted that neither White nor J.L. created a rule
requiring a tip to contain predictive elements because this would be
contrary to the totality of circumstances test enunciated by the Court.123
Unlike both White and J.L., the Eighth Circuit reasoned, the basis of an
informant’s knowledge is most always apparent in drunk driving tips,
because these tips come from eyewitness observations.124
A Supreme Court of Vermont justice enunciated this exact sentiment in a
concurrence in State v. Boyea:
The offense alleged here did not involve a concealed crime—a
possessory offense. What was described in the police dispatch to
the arresting officer was a crime in progress, carried out in
public, identifiable and observable by anyone in sight of its
commission. Unlike the tip alleged in White—that White was
121. See, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d at 734-35 (stating that unlike possessory offense crimes,
where the predictive information requirement may be the only way an informant’s
knowledge can be corroborated, in erratic driving cases, the tip “[a]lmost always . . . comes
from . . . eyewitness observations”); Golotta, 837 A.2d at 367-68 (noting that anonymous
tips placed through the 911 system are, by their nature, more reliable); State v. Hanning, 296
S.W.3d 44, 49-50 (Tenn. 2009) (quoting State v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 32 (Tenn. 1993)
(“[W]hen an informant reports an incident at or near the time of its occurrence, a court can
often assume that the report is first-hand, and hence reliable.”)).
122. Wheat, 278 F.3d at 734.
123. Id. (quoting United States v. Johnson, 64 F.3d 1120, 1125 n.3 (8th Cir. 1995)).
124. See id.
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carrying narcotics— . . . here a total stranger could have
observed defendant’s driving abilities.
No intimate or
confidential relationship was required to support the accuracy of
the observation. The caller simply reported a contemporaneous
observation of criminal activity taking place in his line of
sight.125
In Bloomingdale v. State, the Supreme Court of Delaware stated that
another reason that anonymous tips involving drunk drivers are generally
more reliable is that these tips deal with automobiles.126 “It would be
difficult for a tipster accurately to place a moving vehicle in a particular
location at a specific time if the tipster has not immediately observed that
vehicle.”127 Because of this, the court held that law enforcement should be
able to give greater weight to an anonymous tip alleging unsafe driving
when the factual situation includes: “(a) the precise description of the
vehicle; and (b) the officer’s corroboration of the descriptive features of the
vehicle and the location of its travel [is] in close temporal proximity to
when the report was made.”128
Finally, many of these courts have addressed Kennedy’s concurrence in
J.L. about the concern of harassment associated with reliance on
anonymous tips. The gist of the consideration of the risk of harassment is
that the risk of bad-natured hoaxes carried out by private citizens is
outweighed by the considerable government interest in initiating a stop as
soon as possible.129
Again, as seen with the reasoning by most courts in holding that drunk
driving possesses a unique and imminent danger sufficient to distinguish it
from J.L., the reasoning employed by the Eighth Circuit and the Supreme
Courts of Delaware and Vermont are merely representative—most courts
have used similar logic in holding that anonymous tips provide reasonable
suspicion under the Fourth Amendment.
3. Traffic Stops Possess Less Invasive Qualities than Searches and
Seizures on Foot
Another way that courts adhering to the majority position distinguish the
factual situation of an alleged drunk driver from the one in J.L. is that an
125. State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 875 (Vt. 2000) (Skoglund, J., concurring).
126. Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212, 1220-21 (Del. 2004).
127. Id. at 1221.
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d at 735-36; Bloomingdale, 842 A.2d at 1220-21; State v.
Hanning, 296 S.W.3d 44, 51 (Tenn. 2009).
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investigative traffic stop is typically less invasive of individual privacy than
a search and seizure on foot.130 The Eighth Circuit in Wheat readily
acknowledged that people have the right to proceed unmolested on public
In
roads, and that investigative stops intrude upon that right.131
differentiating the investigative traffic stop from the publicly seen frisk that
was considered in J.L., however, the Eighth Circuit stated that investigative
traffic stops are “considerably less invasive, both physically and
psychologically.”132
In State v. Boyea, the Supreme Court of Vermont stated that because an
investigative stop and questioning was at issue, as opposed to “a hands-on
violation of the person,” the liberty interest at stake was not of as high of a
level as was seen in the J.L. case.133 The concurrence in Boyea even looked
at Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, where the Supreme Court held
that sobriety checkpoints were constitutional.134
In doing so, the
concurrence noted that the Court found that the sobriety checkpoint stop
only slightly intruded upon motorists, which weighed in favor of allowing
sobriety checkpoints to exist.135 The concurrence finally implied that the
properties of the investigative traffic stop were similar to the sobriety
checkpoint stop, which in turn implied that the investigative traffic stop
only slightly intrudes upon motorists.136
In another case, the Supreme Court of Tennessee ruled that an
investigative traffic stop differed from the stop and frisk seen in J.L. in that
the intervention by the police was brief and did not entail physical contact
between the officer and alleged drunk driver.137 Similarly, the Supreme
Court of Iowa differentiated the drunk driver/anonymous tip situation from
J.L. because the intrusion on privacy is less than that associated with a patdown situation.138 Although not all courts in the majority position have
130. See, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d at 737 (noting that investigative traffic stops are
considerably less invasive than a public stop and frisk); Hanning, 296 S.W.3d at 51 (noting
that an investigative stop lacks the physical contact of a stop and frisk, and is thus less
invasive).
131. Wheat, 278 F.3d at 737 (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 657 (1979)).
132. Id.
133. State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 868 (Vt. 2000).
134. See id. at 875 (Skoglund, J., concurring).
135. Id.
136. See id. (implying that if the Court considered the issue at bar, “a brief investigative
stop that poses less intrusion than a physical search of the person” would weigh in favor of
allowing the search under the Fourth Amendment, as the Court held it to do in Sitz).
137. State v. Hanning, 296 S.W.3d 44, 51 (Tenn. 2009).
138. State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 630 (Iowa 2001).
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considered the lower level of invasiveness posed by an investigative traffic
stop as a means for distinguishing the drunk driving situation from that in
J.L., the courts that have considered it have all accepted this line of
reasoning.
4. Drivers Possess a Diminished Expectation of Privacy on the Road
Finally, at least one court differentiated the drunk driving situation from
that in J.L. by reasoning that drivers possess a diminished expectation of
privacy on public roads.139 This is because “in light of the pervasive
regulation of vehicles capable of traveling on the public highways,
individuals generally have a reduced expectation of privacy while driving a
vehicle on public thoroughfares.”140 In stating this, the Supreme Court of
California was looking at the line of United States Supreme Court cases
considering and allowing sobriety checkpoints.141 In order to justify
sobriety checkpoints, the Court, along with other federal courts, announced
that individuals driving on public roads possess a lower expectation of
privacy while on those public roads.142
B. The Minority View: These Stops Violate the Fourth Amendment
Although the majority position is that traffic stops based on nothing
more than anonymous tips alleging drunk driving are constitutionally
permissible, the minority takes a different stance; holding that these stops,
absent prior independent corroboration of drunken driving by law
enforcement, are prohibited under the Fourth Amendment.143 The courts in
the minority position focus heavily on the J.L. opinion, holding that an
anonymous tip alleging drunk driving is not factually distinct enough from
the anonymous tip that alleged the concealed possession of the firearm.144
139. See People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 816 (Cal. 2006).
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. See, e.g., Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1990);
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392-93
(1985) (citing Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1973)); 68 AM. JUR. 2D, supra
note 18, § 192.
143. See State v. Sparen, No. CR00258199S, 2001 WL 206078 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 9,
2001); Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d 288 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000); State v.
Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1994); Hall v. State, 74 S.W.3d 521 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002);
Harris v. Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 2009); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071
(Wyo. 1999).
144. See, e.g., Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 644-45 (noting that the anonymous tip required
independent police corroboration prior to the investigative stop); Hall, 74 S.W.3d at 527
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As a result, the minority typically focuses on: (1) the lack of reliability
associated with anonymous informants;145 (2) both the lack of predictive
information located in the tips, which would not be readily available to
uninformed bystanders, and the risk of harassment associated with
anonymous tips;146 and (3) that the risk associated with drunk driving does
not justify side-stepping an important constitutional restraint as found in the
Fourth Amendment.147
1. Lack of Reliability Associated with Anonymous Informants
In one of the most recent cases that an anonymous tip alleging drunk
driving has been considered, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in Harris v.
Commonwealth, relied heavily on the language in J.L. dealing with
decreased reliability associated with anonymous tips.148 In Harris, the
court stated that anonymous tips are relatively unreliable, which means
more information is required in order for a responding officer to
corroborate sufficiently the allegations contained in such tips.149 Further,
quoting Alabama v. White, the court stated, “an anonymous tip alone
seldom demonstrates the informant’s basis of knowledge or veracity.”150
Similarly, holding that an investigative stop based solely upon an
anonymous tip was constitutionally prohibited, the Court of Appeals of
Texas, in Hall v. State, leaned heavily upon the fact that anonymous tips are
considered less reliable.151 Since the tip at issue was less reliable due to its
anonymity, the test laid out in Alabama v. White required a greater level of
information to give rise to reasonable suspicion.152 Further, in quoting a
prior decision, the court maintained, “a police officer generally cannot rely

(noting that, as in J.L., the anonymous tip was not sufficiently corroborated by police prior
to stop); Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 147 (noting that the alleged driver’s actions were not enough
to give reasonable suspicion to the police officer, prior to his instigating an investigative
stop).
145. See, e.g., Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d at 291-93; Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 644-45; Hall,
74 S.W.3d at 525-27; Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 145-46; McChesney, 988 P.2d at 1075-77.
146. See, e.g., Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d at 291-93; Miller, 510 N.W.2d at 644-45; Hall,
74 S.W.3d at 525-27; Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 145-46; McChesney, 988 P.2d at 1075-77.
147. See Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d at 291-93; State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 884-85 (Vt.
2000) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
148. See Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 145-46.
149. Id. at 145 (citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000)).
150. Id. at 145-46 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)).
151. See Hall, 74 S.W.3d at 525.
152. Id.
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on a police broadcast of an anonymous phone call to establish reasonable
suspicion.”153
All of the minority jurisdictions hold that something more than a barebones tip is required to give rise to reasonable suspicion.154 This increased
indicia of reliability can come from “an officer’s prior knowledge and
experience,”155 predictive information with which to test the anonymous
informant’s basis of knowledge and veracity,156 or even an increased
number of calls making the same allegations.157
2. Lack of Predictive Information/Risk of Harassment
Another heavily emphasized reason for disallowing these stops is that
anonymous tips generally include information that is readily available to
anyone.158 This was another reason for disallowing the stop and frisk that
was seen in J.L.159 There, the Supreme Court stated that this information is
valuable because it helps the police correctly identify the accused.160
However, this information is only valuable to a point, because without
predictive information relating to the alleged criminal activity, police
officers have no means with which to test the “informant’s knowledge or
credibility.”161
In Harris v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia reasoned
that an anonymous tip, which included the location of the vehicle, its make,
color, license plate number, driver’s name, and stated that the car was
“headed south, towards the city, possibly towards the south side,” did not
suffice as predictive information.162 Further, the court stated that an
anonymous tip does not need to include such predictive information when it
153. Id. (quoting Garcia v. State, 3 S.W.3d 227, 234-35 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999)).
154. See, e.g., id. (noting that “there must be some further indicia . . . from which a police
officer may reasonably conclude that the tip is reliable and a detention is justified”); Harris,
668 S.E.2d at 145-46 (noting that a bare-boned tip, without predictive information, does not
give rise to reasonable suspicion).
155. Hall, 74 S.W.3d at 525.
156. Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 145-46 (citing Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000)).
157. State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638, 642 (N.D. 1994) (citing State v. Kettleson, 486
N.W.2d 227, 228 (N.D. 1992)).
158. See, e.g., id.; Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 145; McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 107677 (Wyo. 1999).
159. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 269-72 (“The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a
tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate
person.”).
160. Id. at 272.
161. Id. at 271.
162. Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 144, 146.

782

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:759

is alleging a readily observable criminal activity.163 In direct conflict with
the courts in the majority, however, the court maintained that the crime of
drunk driving is not, in and of itself, a readily observable criminal action.164
Accordingly, the court stated that a police officer must personally see the
instance of drunk driving prior to being justified in conducting an
investigative stop.165
Similarly, the Supreme Court of North Dakota concluded that an
investigative stop based upon a tip that gave details about the alleged drunk
driver that could be easily obtained by the general public was
unconstitutional.166 In State v. Miller, the informant claimed he was
working at a local Wendy’s, and a driver waiting in the drive-thru line
“could barely hold his head up.”167 The court declared that while this tip
did give some evidence of possible criminal activity, the informant’s
allegation did not give rise to reasonable suspicion, absent the police officer
independently corroborating the driver’s drunkenness prior to conducting
an investigative stop.168
These courts reason that if they allow police to conduct investigative
stops based solely upon tips providing information readily available to
uninformed bystanders, the possibility of the anonymous tip coming from a
prankster or someone with a grudge would greatly increase.169 Further,
referencing the Kennedy concurrence in J.L., it would allow tipsters to lie
with impunity.170
3. Danger Posed by Drunk Driving Not Enough
Although somewhat implicit, proponents of the minority view deny that
the increased risk posed by drunk drivers warrants allowing police officers
163. Id. at 146.
164. Compare id., with United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 734 (8th Cir. 2001)
(quoting State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 875 (Vt. 2000) (“The offense alleged here did not
involve a concealed crime – a possessory offense. What was described . . . was a crime in
progress, carried out in public, identifiable and observable by anyone in sight of its
commission.”)).
165. Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 146.
166. State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638, 642-43 (N.D. 1994).
167. Id. at 639.
168. Id. at 644.
169. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d 288, 291 (Mass. App. Ct.
2000) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lyons, 564 N.E.2d 390, 393 (Mass. 1990) (“The
corroboration went only to obvious details . . . . Anyone can telephone police for any
reason.”)); Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 144, 146.
170. See Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 144, 146 (quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 275
(Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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to conduct investigative stops based solely on anonymous tips.171
Dissenting in State v. Boyea, Justice Johnson stated, “public safety is not a
novel concern of this century.”172 He then traced the history of the Fourth
Amendment, focusing on the fact that when the Framers of the Constitution
crafted the Fourth Amendment, they did so against the backdrop of living
“under a system of unbridled search and seizure allegedly justified by
dozens of ‘dangers’ that evolved in the British common law and statute
books.”173
In Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts
made two arguments based on the exigencies associated with drunk
driving.174 First, the Commonwealth argued that such an anonymous tip
fell under the “emergency doctrine,” as crafted in Massachusetts state
courts.175 Essentially, the emergency doctrine entails that there is a
situation that requires immediate police action in order to protect life and
property.176 The Massachusetts Court of Appeals, however, stated that this
doctrine did not apply. When the officer came across the alleged drunk
driver, the driver was not driving erratically.177 The court came to this
conclusion even though the anonymous informant had stayed on the phone
with the police and was following the vehicle, eventually seeing the vehicle
driving on the wrong side of the road.178 The reason for not recognizing the
emergency doctrine was that the driver was on the correct side of the road
when the officer came across him, and thus no emergency existed when the
officer could have acted.179
Moreover, the Commonwealth argued that a “community caretaking
function” applied. This allows police, without reasonable suspicion, to do
such things as check on people in rest areas during cold weather, or other
activities associated with the officer’s concern for a person’s well-being.180
171. See, e.g., Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d at 291-93 (implying that the circumstances were
not exigent enough to give credence to emergency or community-caretaking exception
arguments); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 884-85 (Vt. 2000) (Johnson, J., dissenting)
(noting that during the crafting of the Fourth Amendment, many other comparable dangers
existed).
172. Boyea, 765 A.2d at 884-85 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
173. Id.
174. See Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d at 291-93.
175. Id. at 291-92.
176. Id. at 292.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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The Court of Appeals of Massachusetts held firm, though, stating that this
exception could not be applied in instances where police officers were
detecting, investigating, or acquiring evidence for the purpose of applying it
to a person’s violation of criminal law.181
By not giving credence to either one of these arguments, the
Massachusetts court implied that the drunk driving situation did not impose
such a high level of danger on the public as to fall into Justice Ginsberg’s
dicta in J.L.182 Similarly, in McChesney v. State, where an anonymous
tipster hotline was set up for the specific purpose of pulling drunk drivers
off the road, the Supreme Court of Wyoming relied on highway patrol
protocol when it ruled unconstitutional a stop based solely on an
anonymous tip.183 The highway patrol in Wyoming had been taught to
respond to anonymous tips if they could “establish probable cause based
upon their own observations[,] not relying on the [anonymous tips].”184
Again, it is implicit in this that the Supreme Court of Wyoming did not hold
the dangers associated with a possible drunk driver sufficient to allow
police to sidestep the Fourth Amendment, absent independent corroboration
of the erratic driving prior to the investigative stop.185
C. Oklahoma Takes the Minority Position
In the 2009 case of Nilsen v. State, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals—Oklahoma’s highest criminal court—considered the issue of
anonymous tips alleging drunk driving.186 In Nilsen, an anonymous
informant called into 911 and alleged that he or she had seen a person
“drinking a beer while driving.”187 The tip included a description of the
alleged drunk driver’s vehicle, its license plate number, and a general
location of its whereabouts.188 A deputy sheriff located a vehicle matching
the anonymous tip’s description, and without observing any traffic violation
or indication of criminal activity, conducted an investigative stop of the
vehicle.189 At trial, the deputy testified that “he observed no traffic offense,
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 988 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Wyo. 1999).
184. Id. at 1077-78.
185. See id. (reasoning that law enforcement is taught not to rely solely on REDDI tips,
holding that the tip was not itself sufficient, and implying that the situation was not exigent
enough to sidestep a requirement).
186. See generally Nilsen v. State, 203 P.3d 189 (Okla. Crim. App. 2009).
187. Id. at 190.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 191.
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no equipment failure or anything else that would have provided a basis for
the stop” prior to pulling the vehicle over.190
In a summary opinion, the court traced the evolution of the case law
regarding anonymous tips in the context of drunk driving.191 The court
stated that the key to Alabama v. White was that the police officer
sufficiently corroborated the anonymous tip when the officer verified
“significant aspects of the caller’s predictions” prior to conducting the
investigative stop.192 The court then stated that the modest amount of
reliability in White was not present in J.L. due to the lack of predictive
information in the tip, which left no means for the police to test the tipster’s
knowledge or credibility.193 The court then stressed the portion of J.L. that
strengthened the predictive element requirement:
While the [J.L.] Court acknowledged that the caller had provided
an accurate description of the subject’s ‘readily observable
location and appearance’ which helped the police identify the
accused it noted that ‘[s]uch a tip, however, does not show that
the tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity. The
reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a tip be reliable
in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a
determinate person.’194
After looking to precedent on the issue, the court sided with the minority
of jurisdictions. It found that an anonymous tip alleging drunk driving,
combined with a description of the accused’s vehicle, the vehicle’s general
location, and the vehicle’s license plate number, did not give rise to
reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an investigative stop under the
Fourth Amendment.195 The reasoning for this was threefold: (1) the
informant was anonymous, and thus law enforcement had no way to assess
the reliability of the tip; (2) there was a heightened risk of false accusation
due to the informant remaining anonymous; and (3) the tip included only a
means for which the responding officer could identify the accused drunk
driver and did not contain predictive information that would help the
responding officer corroborate the allegation of drunk driving.196
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
See id. at 191-92.
Id. at 191 (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331 (1990)).
Id. (quoting Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000)).
Id. (quoting J.L., 529 U.S. at 272).
See id. at 190-92.
Id. at 192.
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IV. Analysis
Roughly one death occurs every forty-eight minutes in America due to
alcohol-related traffic accidents.197 In 2009, the 10,839 deaths associated
with alcohol-impaired driving accounted for thirty-two percent of the total
number of traffic fatalities in the United States.198 In Oklahoma, the
statistic is in perfect correlation with the national number—thirty-two
percent of all traffic fatalities in the state, or 235 deaths, resulted from
alcohol-impaired drivers in traffic accidents in 2009.199 Notwithstanding
the statistics, a blanket exception to traditional Fourth Amendment
protections, as advanced by the majority position, is unwarranted.
The overarching standard for Fourth Amendment reasonableness entails
balancing the invasiveness of a given search or seizure against the
governmental interest in performing the search or seizure.200 As stated in
White and applied in J.L., an anonymous tip can lead to reasonable
suspicion when the tip contains either a sufficient quantity of information,
or degree of reliability, when viewed under the totality of the
circumstances.201
Applying the White/J.L. rule to the drunk driving situation, the majority
of investigative stops based solely upon anonymous tips alleging drunk
driving are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. First, the level of
invasiveness posed by the investigative traffic stop associated with the
anonymous tip alleging drunk driving is much lower than that posed by the
stop and frisk search associated with the anonymous tip alleging a
concealed possessory offense. This sets a low threshold to meet in terms of
Fourth Amendment reasonableness. As a result of this low threshold, a
lower degree of reliability is required of the anonymous tip alleging drunk
driving than was required of the tip in J.L.
Although unnecessary, the anonymous tip alleging drunk driving
possesses relatively high indicia of reliability. Thus, because there are
several factors present in the drunk driving situation that when weighed in
the totality of the circumstances surpass the threshold required by the low
197. See DEP’T OF TRANSP., NAT’L HWY. TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., TRAFFIC SAFETY
FACTS OKLAHOMA 2005-2009, at 6 (2009), available at http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.
gov/departments/nrd-30/ncsa/STSI/40_OK/2009/40_OK_2009.PDF.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S.
523, 537-38 (1967).
201. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270-72 (2000); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325,
330 (1990).
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level of invasiveness posed by the situation, most investigative stops are
reasonable even without independent police corroboration. Some of these
factors are always present in the drunk driving situation. For example,
anonymous tips are not very “anonymous” anymore. Also, the crime of
erratic driving is a readily observable criminal action.
Even though these factors alone are typically not enough to weigh in
favor of a reasonable stop under the Fourth Amendment, when other factors
are present, the situation possesses indicia of reliability high enough to
grant reasonable suspicion to the responding officer. First, when a tip
comes from a firsthand observer, it makes it more likely that the assertions
of illegality in that tip are legitimate. Moreover, when a tip provides a
certain detail of information so that a responding officer can easily find the
accused in a short amount of time, it further provides for greater indicia of
reliability.
When all of these factors exist in a given situation, the anonymous tip
alleging drunk driving possesses a degree of reliability high enough, under
the totality of the circumstances, to give rise to reasonable suspicion
sufficient to justify an investigative stop, even without prior independent
police corroboration. This degree of reliability is more than sufficient to
meet the low threshold set by the level of invasiveness posed by the
investigative stop. When some factors are not present, it is likely that a stop
would be unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Finally, in cases
that can be considered “close calls,” the social policy that has been
advanced by the Court in attempting to rid roads of drunk drivers pushes
these cases over the edge of reasonableness, so to speak, thereby rendering
the investigative stop constitutional.
A. Drunk Driving Does Not Fit into the Public Safety Exception
First, a blanket “drunk driving exception” from traditional Fourth
Amendment protections, as advocated by the majority position, is
unwarranted. In Florida v. J.L., Justice Ginsburg, in dicta, created what has
come to be known as the public safety exception for anonymous tips.
Justice Ginsburg stated that there could be situations where the level of
danger associated with the alleged criminal activity in an anonymous tip
could be so great as to justify an investigative police search even though a
given tip lacks the usual requirement for reliability.202 Although the Court
refrained from enumerating the situations that would fit into this paradigm,
Justice Ginsburg used the example of a tip alleging a person carrying a
202. J.L., 529 U.S. at 273-74.
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bomb as being sufficiently dangerous to not require the same indicia of
reliability prior to police being able to conduct a Terry stop
constitutionally.203 Virtually every court in the majority position has held
that the drunk driver poses a similar danger to the public as a bomb,204
which means that these courts have found that the drunk driving situation
fits into this public safety exception paradigm.
The drunk driver does pose a real danger to the public. Despite this,
courts that have held to the majority view primarily because of the idea that
the drunk driver fits into the public safety exception paradigm are incorrect.
Some courts may argue the drunk driver fits into this paradigm because of a
combination of the number of deaths that drunk driving causes, the
imminence of the threat posed by drunk driving, and because the drunk
driver is similar to a mobile bomb.205
It is true that roughly 120,000 people have lost their lives in alcoholrelated traffic accidents since 2000 when the J.L. decision was
announced.206 The number of gun-related deaths between 2000 and 2007,
however, is nearly double that at 238,405.207 If the allegation in J.L. of the
illegal gun possession was not enough to justify a public safety exception,
then the allegation of a different criminal activity, drunk driving, which
causes roughly half the number of deaths that guns do, should not be treated
as per se reasonable based solely on the harm it causes.
Hence, something more is needed. Courts adhering to the majority view
state that the drunk driver is much more like a bomb in that at any given
203. Id.
204. See, e.g., United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 737 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting State
v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 867 (Vt. 2000) (“[A] drunk driver is not at all unlike a ‘bomb,’ and
a mobile one at that.”)); State v. Crawford, 67 P.3d 115, 118 (Kan. 2003) (quoting State v.
Slater, 986 P.2d 1038, 1046 (Kan. 1999) (“A motor vehicle in the hands of a drunken driver
is an instrument of death. It is deadly, it threatens the safety of the public, and that threat
must be eliminated as quickly as possible.”)); State v. Golotta, 837 A.2d 359, 372 (N.J.
2003) (quoting State v. Tischio, 527 A.2d 388, 396 (N.J. 1987) (“We find the bomb example
[in the J.L. dicta] to be particularly apt because . . . this Court previously has described
intoxicated motorists as ‘moving time bombs.’”)).
205. See, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 736-37; People v. Wells, 136 P.3d 810, 815 (Cal.
2006); Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212, 1221 (Del. 2004); Boyea, 765 A.2d at 867.
206. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRAFFIC
SAFETY FACTS, 2 fig. 1 (2009), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/ncsa/pdf
/2010/811385.pdf.
207. U.S. Firearm Deaths and Death Rates Per 100,000 Population by Year Group and
Intent, BRADY CAMPAIGN TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, http://www.bradycampaign.org/
xshare/Facts/Trends_-_U.S._Firearm_Deaths_and_Death_Rates_by_Year_and_Intent.pdf
(last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
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point in time a drunk driver can lose control of his or her vehicle, much like
at any given point in time a bomb can be detonated.208 The problem with
this reasoning is that it fails to take into account the fact that someone
illegally possessing a gun can pull the gun out and shoot at any moment.
Just like the drunk driver can lose control of his or her vehicle at any time, a
person possessing a gun can cause harm to the public in an instant. Thus,
the drunk driving situation is no more dangerous than the situation where a
person illegally possesses a gun; in fact, based solely upon the statistics, the
drunk driving situation is less dangerous. Since the drunk driving situation
is no more dangerous to the public than the illegal possession of a gun
(which did not fit into the public safety exception), the drunk driving
situation does not fit into Justice Ginsburg’s public safety exception
paradigm.
Furthermore, the public safety exception in J.L. is only dicta.209 By its
very definition, dictum is not controlling judicial precedent.210 Thus, the
majority’s primarily basing its holding on this public safety exception
language is inappropriate. Nevertheless, this does not mean that all
investigative stops based solely upon anonymous tips alleging drunk
driving are per se unreasonable.
B. Low Level of Invasiveness Posed by Investigative Traffic Stop Sets Low
Threshold
While the majority holding is flawed in primarily grounding its
reasoning in J.L.’s dicta, most anonymous tips alleging drunk driving do
justify responding officers performing investigative stops based solely on
these tips. To begin with, investigative traffic stops associated with
anonymous tips alleging drunk driving pose a low level of invasiveness to
the public. This sets a low bar for the totality of the circumstances to meet
in terms of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
The reasoning for this low level of invasiveness is twofold: (1) the
investigative traffic stop occurs in a vehicle—a place so heavily regulated
by the government that it is hard to see how a person could have a high
expectation of privacy while operating one; and (2) in an initial
investigative traffic stop, there is no physical contact between the police
officer and the suspect.
208. See, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d at 737; Crawford, 67 P.3d at 118; Golotta, 837 A.2d at
372.
209. See Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2000).
210. See 20 AM. JUR. 2D Courts § 134 (2005); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 519 (9th ed.
2009).
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1. Lower Expectation of Privacy in Vehicles
It is no secret that in order to operate a motor vehicle legally on a public
thoroughfare, many requirements must be met. In Oklahoma, these include
acquiring an appropriate driver’s license, having automobile insurance,
having a current license tag, registration, and title for one’s vehicle, one’s
vehicle meeting certain minimum safety requirements, wearing a seat belt
while driving, and properly using child restraint seats when carrying a child
under six years of age.211 All of these regulations have led the Supreme
Court of the United States to consistently hold that occupants of
automobiles have a reduced expectation of privacy while operating these
automobiles.212
The Supreme Court’s recognition of a diminished expectation of privacy
associated with motor vehicles does not automatically mean that a police
stop for any reason is justified. But it does mean that less indicia of
reliability possessed by an anonymous tip will suffice to meet Fourth
Amendment reasonableness. There is no similar case law stating that,
despite the various regulations a person has to abide by while in public—
having a license to carry a gun,213 wearing clothes,214 not jaywalking,215
etc.—a person’s physical self possesses a lower expectation of privacy.
Granted, an automobile being pulled over by a police officer is still invasive
like the Terry stop and frisk in J.L. in that the nature of the stop is
investigative—the officer is looking for evidence of a crime. Nonetheless,
because of the Supreme Court’s consistently noting this decreased
expectation of privacy associated with automobiles, the investigative traffic
stop, which occurs while the person is in an automobile, poses a low level
of invasiveness to the public.
2. No Physical Contact in an Investigative Stop
Another reason the investigative traffic stop poses a low level of
invasiveness is that there is no physical contact in an initial investigative
stop in response to drunk driving allegations. Conversely, there is clear
physical contact between the officer and the suspect when a Terry stop and
frisk is conducted to search for a concealed weapon. This may seem all too
211. See OKLA. DEP’T OF PUBLIC SAFETY, OKLAHOMA DRIVER’S MANUAL 3-1, 3-2, 3-3
(2010), available at http://www.dps.state.ok.us/dls/pub/ODM.pdf.
212. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392 (1985) (citing Cady v. Dombrowski,
413 U.S. 433, 440-41 (1973)); 68 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 18, § 192.
213. See 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1290.5 (Supp. 2007).
214. See id. § 1021(A)(1).
215. See 47 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 11-501 (West 2001).
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obvious. The fact is, however, that because of this difference, the
investigative stop of an automobile in response to an anonymous tip
alleging drunk driving is less invasive of a person’s privacy. Looking back
to Terry v. Ohio, where the Supreme Court first crafted the reasonable
suspicion standard, a major point of concern in allowing the stop and frisk
of a suspect without an officer first obtaining a search warrant was the
degree of invasiveness associated with a frisk.216 While the officer will
always make contact with the suspect when he or she performs a physical
frisk of a person in attempt to find a concealed weapon, when an officer
conducts an investigative traffic stop in response to an anonymous tip
alleging drunk driving, he or she merely has a short conversation with the
suspect while the suspect remains in his or her car. There is no physical
contact made in this context. Thus, while the investigative traffic stop is
admittedly a seizure no matter how brief and no matter what the purpose
is,217 the traffic stop is much less like a search than the physical frisk of a
person.
Law enforcement officers are no doubt put through extensive training in
order to learn to detect signs of intoxication in motorists. They can use this
training to minimize the level of invasiveness posed by investigative stops
based on drunk driving allegations. By contrast, police officers have no
means with which to make a hands-on frisk less invasive. Placing one’s
hands on another, no matter how limited the search, is quite an invasion of
that person’s privacy. Further, it is not only physically invasive—when an
officer frisks a person, it also has psychological effects on that person,
including embarrassment, or even a sense of being violated. This is not the
case with the investigative traffic stop. It can be safely assumed that if
someone had to choose between a hands-on violation by a strange, armed
cop, and a conversation with that strange, armed cop while sitting in a
vehicle, ten out of ten people would elect for the conversation.
The low level of invasiveness posed by an investigative traffic stop
creates a low threshold for circumstances to meet before a given stop is
reasonable. Accordingly, the totality of the circumstances in a given case
requires a tip to possess lower indicia of reliability prior to a stop based
upon that tip being reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

216. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25 (1968) (noting that the physical frisk of a person
“must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience”).
217. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
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C. The Indicia of Reliability Is Sufficient the Majority of the Time
Due to the low threshold set by the invasiveness posed by the
investigative traffic stop, a lower indicia of reliability is required of the
anonymous tip alleging drunk driving than was required of the tip in J.L. in
order for a given stop to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Although this is the case, the anonymous tip alleging drunk driving
possesses relatively high indicia of reliability. This is because there are
several factors typically present in the drunk driving situation that, when
weighed in the totality of the circumstances, are more than sufficient to
grant reasonable suspicion to the responding officer sufficient to justify a
given investigative traffic stop based solely on an anonymous tip.
Some of these factors are always present in the drunk driving situation.
These factors alone are typically not enough to weigh in favor of a
reasonable investigative traffic stop. When other factors are present in a
given situation, however, the level of reasonableness required by the Fourth
Amendment is more than met. To better understand this, a look at each is
warranted.
1. Factors Always Present
Some of the factors that lead to a higher degree of reliability in the drunk
driving situation are always present. In other words, by its very nature, the
anonymous tip alleging drunk driving is more reliable than the anonymous
tip alleging the concealed possessory offense. These factors that are always
present are: (a) the fact that anonymous tips are no longer truly
“anonymous;” and (b) that the crime of erratic driving is a readily
observable criminal action.
a) Anonymous Tips Are No Longer “Anonymous”
Concurring in Florida v. J.L., Justice Kennedy warned of an anonymous
tipster’s ability to “lie with impunity” in the anonymous tip framework.218
Courts and commentators alike have used this as one of their strongest
points when advancing the minority position.219 Even the Eighth Circuit in
218. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 275 (2000) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
219. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d 288, 291 (Mass. App. Ct.
2000) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lyons, 564 N.E.2d 390, 390 (Mass. 1990); Harris v.
Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141, 146 (Va. 2009) (quoting J.L., 529 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy,
J., concurring)); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 880-81 (Vt. 2000) (Johnson, J., dissenting);
Michael B. Kunz, “One Free Swerve”?: Requiring Police to Corroborate Anonymous Tips in
Order to Establish Reasonable Suspicion for Warrantless Seizure of Alleged Drunk Drivers
86-88 (2010) (unpublished Distinguished Student Research Paper, American University
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United States v. Wheat admitted that the risk of harassment is a real concern
with the anonymous tip, although it sided with the majority position
regarding tips alleging drunk driving.220
While this seems like a strong point at first blush, a closer look reveals
that the risk of harassment associated with anonymous tips is overstated.
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence stated that without any means of testing the
tipster’s credibility, the risk of false accusation becomes unacceptable in the
anonymous tip framework.221 Yet, the thrust of Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence was support for the use of caller identification by 911 systems
so that if a tip proves false, the tipster may be held accountable for his or
her actions.222 In other words, caller identification can both limit this risk
of false accusation, and sometimes provide a means for law enforcement to
assess the reliability of the tip.
Today, caller identification has been implemented by 911 systems across
the country.223 In fact, the Federal Communications Commission rules that
typically allow a person to block one’s number from caller identification
services do not allow number blocking for calls placed to emergency
services lines.224 Thus, when a person calls into systems such as 911, that
person’s name and/or phone number—even the address if the call is placed
from a landline—is available to the 911 operator so that emergency
vehicles can be pointed in the direction of the place of emergency (or the
false accuser).225
While this does not account for the nearly seventy percent of all 911 calls
placed by cellular phones,226 the FCC has implemented rules requiring
cellular telephone service providers not only to ensure that the cellular
phones they sell are capable of location services, but also to make it
possible to trace calls placed to emergency services providers to very
specific locations.227 The FCC rules require service providers to be able to
Washington College of Law), available at http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/stu_dis
tinguished_papers/1/.
220. See United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 729, 735-36 (8th Cir. 2001).
221. J.L., 529 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
222. See id. at 274-76.
223. PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, FACT SHEET 19: CALLER ID AND MY PRIVACY 3
(2000), available at http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs19-cid.htm.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See Guide: Wireless 911 Services, FCC.GOV (May 26, 2011), http://www.fcc.gov/
guides/wireless-911-services).
227. See id.; Cell Phones and 9-1-1. NAT’L EMERGENCY NO. ASS’N, http://www.nena.
org/?page=911Cellphones (last visited Oct. 4, 2012).
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pinpoint the location of a caller from a mobile phone when a call is placed
to 911 so that the operator has this information at hand.228 This is obviously
so that emergency services vehicles can quickly respond to the caller and
give assistance as needed. Just as with calls placed from landlines, though,
the ability to identify the phone number and location from which a call is
placed into the 911 system greatly reduces the likelihood of a tipster being
capable of using law enforcement to harass someone without recourse.
Due to the widespread use of caller identification by emergency services
lines,229 the “anonymous informant” is no longer very anonymous.
Consequently, false accusers typically no longer have the ability to make
phony allegations without being held accountable by the law. In fact,
courts have held that when an informant’s identity is known, and can thus
be held accountable for false accusations, this mitigates the issue
surrounding the police officer’s not having a suspicion based on his or her
own observations.230
Further, another reason heavily emphasized by courts in the minority
position is the decreased reliability associated with anonymous
informants.231 Because the anonymous informant is no longer truly
anonymous, law enforcement is sometimes provided with a means to test
the reliability of the tip prior to responding. For instance, if a person calls
in from a landline in Norman, Oklahoma, and alleges he or she is watching
a driver in a specific car swerving all over the interstate in Oklahoma City,
a responding officer has the means to test the informant’s veracity and basis
of knowledge. In this situation, the officer could conclude that not only the
informant was lying, but also the informant needed to be held accountable
for his or her actions. Conversely, if a tip is placed from a cellular
telephone located on the same interstate where the drunk driver is alleged to

228. See Guide: 911 Wireless Services, supra note 226; Cell Phones and 9-1-1, supra
note 227.
229. This assumes both Enhanced 911 and Wireless E911 being implemented across the
country. See Guide: 911 Wireless Services, supra note 226; Cell Phones and 9-1-1, supra
note 227.
230. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) (“[W]hile the Court’s decisions
indicate that [the known] informant’s unverified tip may have been insufficient for [an]
arrest or search warrant, the [uncorroborated] information carried enough indicia of
reliability to justify the officer’s forcible stop of [the suspect].”) (citations omitted); cf.
United States v. Copening, 506 F.3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 2007).
231. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 74 S.W.3d 521, 525 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002); Harris v.
Commonwealth, 668 S.E.2d 141, 145-46 (Va. 2009) (noting that a bare-boned tip, without
predictive information, does not give rise to reasonable suspicion).
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be in Oklahoma City,232 the responding officer is given more reason to
believe that the tip is legitimate. Once again, however, if the tip proves to
be false, the officer has the means to track down the person who owns the
cellular phone, and can hold him or her accountable for his or her
wrongdoing.
Because law enforcement now has a means to hold false accusers
accountable for their actions, it can be said that this will deter future false
accusers. Additionally, as the number of potential false accusers decreases,
the likelihood that the majority of tips reported are legitimate skyrockets.
Finally, law enforcement officers can now not only hold false accusers
accountable, decreasing the likelihood a tip called in is false, but also
officers can sometimes test the informant’s veracity or basis of knowledge
prior to responding to a given tip based on the location of the tipster in
relation to the location of the alleged drunk driver.
The only caveat to this is that a person could go so far as to place a
phony anonymous tip from either a payphone or public phone. If this were
to occur, the person would have a chance at lying with impunity because it
would be difficult for law enforcement to find out who placed the
anonymous call when the caller identification system only listed the
location of the payphone. What is more, the officer would not have a
means to test the reliability of the tip prior to responding. This small subset
of anonymous tips would admittedly have to be treated with more
skepticism.
b) Erratic Driving Is a Readily Observable Criminal Action
Another factor that boosts the indicia of reliability possessed by the
anonymous tip alleging drunk driving is that erratic driving is a readily
observable criminal action. This is important because if erratic driving is a
readily observable criminal action, anonymous tips alleging drunk driving
become much more reliable than a given tip alleging a concealed
possessory offense, which requires a showing of informant reliability prior
to giving law enforcement reasonable suspicion.233 The minority position
has even conceded that if an alleged crime is readily observable, an

232. This assumes E911 Phase II has been implemented in the area. Although it is
becoming widespread, it will not be available in all areas until the deadline of September 11,
2012. See Guide: 911 Wireless Services, supra note 226; Cell Phones and 9-1-1, supra note
227.
233. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 274 (2000).
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anonymous tip does not have to include predictive information that would
show a tipster’s insider information.234
In order to understand what exactly a readily observable criminal action
entails, a look at the dictionary is warranted. “Readily” is defined as
“quickly,” or “without difficulty.”235 Further, “observable” is defined as
“visible; discernible; noticeable.”236 Putting these two definitions together,
a readily observable criminal action would be one that is noticeable without
difficulty, or quickly visible.
To better understand why erratic driving is readily observable, recall the
two major Supreme Court cases, supra. In Alabama v. White, the
anonymous tip alleged the possession of illegal drugs located in a brown
briefcase.237 This clearly would not fall into the category of a readily
observable criminal action. Prior to the police conducting an investigative
stop, the only way that an anonymous tipster could have known of the
woman’s transporting the drugs was if that tipster possessed insider
information. Therefore, in objectively looking at an anonymous tip alleging
the concealed transport of drugs, the risk of the tip being unreliable,
whether because it was fabricated in order to harass the woman or
otherwise, was very high. This is why the Court stated that something more
than a bare-bones tip alleging the illegal possession of drugs located in a
briefcase was required—a showing of reliability that indicated the
anonymous informant possessed inside information.238
Similarly, in J.L., the crime alleged was the illegal possession of a
firearm.239 In objectively looking at an anonymous tip alleging the
possession of a concealed firearm, this also would not fall into the category
of a readily observable criminal action. Unless the accused inadvertently
showed his gun to a bystander, the only way an anonymous tipster could
have known of the concealed weapon was if that tipster possessed insider
information pertaining to the accused’s illegally possessing the concealed
firearm.
While it is possible that the young man in J.L. did accidentally expose
his gun to a bystander, the anonymous informant did not relay this fact

234. See Harris, 668 S.E.2d at 146 (citing Jackson v. Commonwealth, 594 S.E.2d 595,
603 (Va. 2004)).
235. WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1500 (2d ed. 1983).
236. Id. at 1235.
237. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 327 (1990).
238. See id. at 332.
239. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 269 (2000).
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when he called the police and made the allegations.240 Further, the
responding officers testified that the suspect made no movements out of the
ordinary upon their arrival, nor gave them reason for suspicion in any other
way.241 Because the informant did not state that he had observed the
suspect expose his weapon, and the responding officers testified the way
that they did, it explains why the Court reasoned that the informant had to
have possessed insider information regarding the concealed possessory
offense. This, in turn, explains why, as in White, the Supreme Court in J.L.
stated that such a tip would have to include a showing of insider
information prior to giving rise to reasonable suspicion.242
Comparing both the illegal possession of drugs hidden in a plain,
commonly-used briefcase, and the illegal possession of a gun hidden under
a person’s clothes with the crime of erratic driving, there is a clear
difference. In drunk driving cases, tipsters are seeing people driving on the
wrong side of the road,243 cutting other cars off,244 stumbling out of bars
prior to getting behind the wheel,245 and almost causing head-on collisions
or hitting guardrails.246 The things anonymous tipsters are seeing in these
cases are readily observable to anyone in the accused’s vicinity. Noticing
things that are visible without difficulty to anyone that is sharing the road
with the alleged drunk driver does not require the insider knowledge that it
would take for a person to know that John Doe is carrying illegal drugs in
his briefcase, or that he is carrying a firearm concealed beneath his clothes.
240. Id. at 268.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 272.
243. See Commonwealth v. Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d 288, 290 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000)
(tipping that “a pickup truck with Massachusetts license plate number D34-314 was
traveling on the wrong side of Route 195 in the vicinity of Route 140 in New Bedford”).
244. See United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 2001). (tipping that “[a] tanand cream-colored Nissan Stanza . . . whose license plate began with the letters W-O-C, was
being driven erratically in the northbound lane of Highway 169 . . . .” and complaining “that
the Nissan was passing on the wrong side of the road, cutting off other cars, and otherwise
being driven as if by a ‘complete maniac.’”); McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1073
(Wyo. 1999) (tipping that “a red Mercury with temporary plates was weaving between lanes,
passing cars, and slowing down in order to pass them again”).
245. See State v. Scholl, 684 N.W.2d 83, 84 (S.D. 2004) (“The informant gave the
license plate number of the vehicle . . . described the vehicle as a blue Toyota Tacoma
pickup” and that the informant had seen the driver “leaving Scarlet O’Hara’s bar stumbling
pretty badly”).
246. See State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714, 715-16 (Haw. 2004) (stating that the
informant “reported that the [alleged drunk driver] had almost caused several head-on
collisions and had almost hit a guardrail”).
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The minority would no doubt argue that regardless of a person’s driving
erratically, it does not mean he or she is drunk. While driving erratically
and driving drunk are not mutually dependent upon each other, whether a
person is drunk or otherwise, a vehicle’s being operated erratically still
legally justifies an officer to stop the vehicle.247 Accordingly, the fact that
erratic driving—whether caused by alcohol-impairment or not—is a readily
observable criminal action, boosts the reliability of the tip alleging such
driving.
2. Factors That, When Present, Weigh in Favor of Allowing These Stops
Though the factors above will most always be present in the drunk
driving situation, those factors alone are typically not enough to justify
investigative stops under the Fourth Amendment. Other “elevating
circumstances” are required by the White/J.L. rule for dealing with
anonymous tips and reasonable suspicion. These “elevating circumstances”
include: (a) when a tip includes enough information so that it can be
reasonably concluded the tip comes from a firsthand observer; and (b) when
a tip provides enough descriptive information so that the accused can be
found by a responding officer in a very short amount of time.
a) When Tips Come from Firsthand Observations
When a tip alleging drunk driving comes from contemporaneous,
firsthand observations, it further increases the tip’s indicia of reliability.
Whether the tip is from another motorist sharing the road with the alleged
drunk driver calling in from his or her cellular telephone,248 a person seeing
someone stumble out of a bar and get in a car to leave,249 or a worker at a
247. See, e.g., England v. State, 560 P.2d 216, 218 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977) (“In a
number of cases, this Court has approved the stopping by officers of motorists whose
method of driving convinced the officers that the manner in which the vehicle was being
driven made it a menace to the traveling public.”); Moore v. State, 306 P.2d 358, 360 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1957).
248. See, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d at 724 (tipping that “[a] tan-and cream-colored Nissan
Stanza . . . whose license plate began with the letters W-O-C, was being driven erratically in
the northbound lane of Highway 169” and complaining “that the Nissan was passing on the
wrong side of the road, cutting off other cars, and otherwise being driven as if by a
‘complete maniac’”); State v. Walshire, 634 N.W.2d 625, 625 (Iowa 2001) (“The call was
apparently made on a cellular phone because the caller was following the subject car.”);
Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d at 290 (involving “an unidentified motorist,” which reported that a
truck was driving erratically on the highway).
249. See Scholl, 684 N.W.2d at 84 (tipping by anonymous informant that he had seen the
driver “leaving Scarlet O’Hara’s bar stumbling pretty badly” prior to getting behind the
wheel and driving off).
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fast food chain seeing a person in the drive-thru line barely being able to
hold his or her head up while behind the wheel,250 when informants simply
report things they are contemporaneously viewing while in the accused’s
vicinity, the assertion of illegality in the tip is much more likely legitimate.
As the Eighth Circuit noted,251 when an informant is also a firsthand
observer, the degree to which the reliability of the tip’s allegations of
criminal activity increases, which means the amount of information
required to provide law enforcement with reasonable suspicion decreases
under the totality of the circumstances.
This does not mean that any tip alleging drunk driving will be the
product of contemporaneous observation, thus requiring less information to
give rise to reasonable suspicion. Instead, there is a threshold that
informants must meet when they make allegations in order to ensure law
enforcement that the informant has “firsthand observer status.” For
instance, a tip that only states, “a red Nissan Maxima is driving northbound
on I-35, and the driver is drunk” would not meet this threshold. This sort of
tip does not give enough information regarding the tipster’s observations,
and it is thus just as likely that the tip is false as it is that the tip is
legitimate.252
A tip that would meet this threshold would look more like this: “A red
Nissan Maxima with the license plate of G-K-U-3-6-5, driving northbound
on I-35, which just passed the Indian Hills Road exit, is being operated by a
drunk driver. I know the driver is drunk because I watched him drink eight
beers in the last hour at O’Connell’s Pub and stumble out to his car to get
behind the wheel. Further I followed him and have seen him swerve
several times, almost causing several accidents.” In a tip like this, not only
is the informant claiming firsthand knowledge, but also the informant is
making much more specific allegations regarding the accused’s criminal
conduct.
The bulk of majority jurisdictions have considered tips that look more
like the latter example in determining whether these tips give rise to
250. See People v. Shafer, 868 N.E.2d 359, 361 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (dealing with “an
employee of Wendy’s restaurant, [who] had called regarding a person who ‘was causing a
disturbance and was intoxicated’ while ordering food at the restaurant’s drive-thru”); State v.
Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638, 639 (N.D. 1994) (involving a Wendy’s employee, who called to
report that a specific car in the drive-thru line was being driven by someone who “could
barely hold his head up”).
251. See Wheat, 278 F.3d at 734.
252. Cf. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000). The tip in the example is very similar
to the tip in J.L., which the Court stated was not sufficient to grant reasonable suspicion to
the responding officer. Id. at 272.
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reasonable suspicion.253 Such tips meet the threshold indicating they are
coming from firsthand observers. Also, remember that law enforcement
has the means to both test the tipsters’ veracity and hold them accountable
if the tips prove to be false via reverse-911 systems.254 This is in stark
contrast to the situation in J.L., where nothing was known about the
anonymous tipster who called the police255 and the allegation was merely
conclusory—“the accused is illegally in possession of a gun.”256 In not
knowing a single thing about the informant—whether he or she had
observed the young man accidentally exposing his concealed weapon while
in public or was merely placing the call to harass or otherwise get the young
man into trouble with the law—the likelihood that the conclusory allegation
of illegality in the tip was true was not very high. Thus, the allegation in
the anonymous tip in J.L. did not justify the investigative stop and frisk that
the police conducted.
The minority position would argue that the tip seen in J.L. could, in fact,
have come from a firsthand observer. There is no doubt that this is a
possibility. Despite this, in looking at anonymous tips, what is in the realm
of possibilities is not the same as what is known to be true when applying a
totality of the circumstances test to determine if reasonable suspicion
existed prior to the stop. If there would have been something known about
the anonymous informant in J.L., such as the informant contemporaneously
observing the accused carrying a gun where it was visible to anyone in the
accused’s vicinity, the tip would have become more reliable. But this was
not the case.257 Because of this, the Court stated that something more was
required than a bare-bones tip, or in other words, something that would help
show the tip’s reliability.258
b) When Tips Point Law Enforcement to the Accused Quickly
Another factor that, when present, increases the tip’s reliability is when
the tipster is able to place the alleged drunk driver in a specific location

253. See Wheat, 278 F.3d at 724; Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212, 1213 (Del.
2004); State v. Prendergast, 83 P.3d 714, 715-16 (Haw. 2004); Walshire, 634 N.W.2d at
625-26; State v. Golotta, 837 A.2d 359, 361 (N.J. 2003); Scholl, 684 N.W.2d 83, 84; Boyea,
765 A.2d at 863 ; Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d at 519.
254. See supra Part IV.B.2.
255. J.L., 529 U.S. at 268.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. Id. at 274.
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where police can easily locate the driver.259 This may not be predictive in
the sense that the informant does not usually allege a final destination
where the drunk driver is travelling, as appeared to be the tipping point in
White when the Supreme Court allowed the investigative stop based upon
an anonymous tip alleging the illegal possession of drugs.260 Nevertheless,
as the Supreme Court of Delaware noted in Bloomingdale v. State, if an
informant can place the vehicle in a location where the responding officer
can quickly locate it, the probability that the informant’s allegation of drunk
driving being true increases.261 This is because it would be very difficult to
fabricate a tip against a person in a car, which has the capability of
travelling at high speeds and readily changing directions, so that a
responding officer could easily be able to locate the alleged drunk driver.
If the purpose of a fabricated anonymous tip were to have the police
harass the accused, then it would be fairly easy to succeed in placing such a
tip against a person on foot who remains in a set location for a meaningful
amount of time, as was the case in J.L.262 It would not be remotely difficult
to know where a person one dislikes is hanging out and place a false tip
alleging that the person is committing any number of crimes at that
location. Placing such a tip alleging drunk driving is a much more difficult
proposition. In the drunk driving context, the accused is behind the wheel
of a vehicle, which is capable of disappearing in an instant.263 If a tipster
can point the otherwise-clueless responding officer to the accused in a short
amount of time, the tipster almost certainly has to possess some sort of
firsthand knowledge regarding the driver. Firsthand knowledge, in turn,
increases the likelihood that the allegations of illegality in the tip are
legitimate, as seen supra.264
The minority would certainly argue that there is no real showing of
reliability with regard to the assertion of illegality in an anonymous tip,
259. See, e.g., State v. Crawford, 67 P.3d 115, 117 (Kan. 2003) (locating and conducting
the investigative stop six minutes after receiving the report of the anonymous tip); State v.
Scholl, 684 N.W.2d 83, 84 (S.D. 2004) (observing the car described in the report and
conducting an investigative stop three to four minutes after responding to the report of the
alleged drunk driver); State v. Boyea, 765 A.2d 862, 863 (Vt. 2000) (locating the alleged
drunk driver within five minutes).
260. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 331-32 (1990).
261. See Bloomingdale v. State, 842 A.2d 1212, 1220 (Del. 2004).
262. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 268.
263. See Bloomingdale, 842 A.2d at 1220; cf. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392-93
(1985) (explaining why a vehicle is excepted from traditional warrant requirements); 68 AM.
JUR. 2D, supra note 18, § 192.
264. See supra Part IV.C.1.

802

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:759

even when a tip can place a vehicle where a responding officer can easily
locate it. While this may be true in isolation, when an informant, who is no
longer truly anonymous and can be held accountable for his or her actions,
witnesses first-hand a readily observable criminal action, such as erratic
driving, and simply calls in a report of what he or she is seeing, and the
responding officer can quickly find the described vehicle in the location it is
alleged to be, the likelihood that a tip is accurate, not only in its ability to
identify the vehicle and driver (the innocent details), but also in its assertion
of illegality (the fact that a person is driving erratically) increases
dramatically.
Due to the low level of invasiveness posed by the investigative traffic
stop, the high indicia of reliability possessed by the anonymous tip alleging
drunk driving renders the majority of investigative traffic stops in response
to anonymous tips alleging drunk driving reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. Furthermore, as consistently announced by the Court, there is
a legitimate State interest in ridding public roads of drunk drivers.265 Thus,
although the majority position’s reasoning is flawed, the bulk of the tips are
constitutional.266
If all of these factors do not come together in a given situation, however,
the investigative stop based solely upon an anonymous tip alleging drunk
driving is on much shakier footing. While close cases may be such that the
investigative stop can be constitutionally upheld due to social policy,267
other cases will come out in favor of disallowing such stops—that is the
nature of a totality of the circumstances test. A continuum is thus created—
the majority of investigative stops, even without prior independent police
corroboration, are reasonable; some stops, which occur in situations that do
not contain all of the above-mentioned factors are unreasonable; and
finally, stops that occur in situations that are “close calls” can be upheld as
reasonable due to social policy forwarded by the Court.

265. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (“No one can
seriously dispute . . . the State’s interest in eradicating [drunk driving.”]); Mackey v.
Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979) (“States surely have [an] interest in removing drunken
drivers from their highways . . . .”).
266. See, e.g., Wheat, 278 F.3d at 724; Bloomingdale, 842 A.2d. at 1213; Prendergast,
83 P.3d at 715-16; Walshire, 634 N.W.2d at 625-26; Lubiejewski, 729 N.E.2d at 290; Miller,
510 N.W.2d at 639; Golotta, 837 A.2d at 361; Scholl, 684 N.W.2d at 84; Boyea, 765 A.2d at
863; Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d at 519; McChesney, 988 P.2d at 1072.
267. See infra Part IV.D.
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D. Stops That Fall in the Middle of the Continuum Should Be Upheld Due
to Social Policy
As demonstrated supra, the typical tip alleging drunk driving contains
factors that give a boost in reliability, helping to give rise to reasonable
suspicion sufficient to justify an investigative stop based solely on such a
tip. But not all tips alleging drunk driving contain all of the discussed
factors. This can make a given situation a much closer call. Despite this,
the social policy against drunk driving that has been forwarded by the Court
in several decisions helps to tip the scale in the “close call” situation in
favor of a given investigative stop being constitutionally justifiable.
The Court has consistently upheld questionable state laws in the face of
conflicting individual rights when drunk driving has been at issue.268 This
has ranged from allowing implied consent laws,269 where the State reserves
the right to summarily suspend a drunk driver’s license without affording
the drunk driver any meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to the
deprivation, to allowing sobriety checkpoint stops, which grant the police
the power to stop a vehicle without any individualized suspicion.270 The
only reasonable explanation for this controversial line of cases is that the
Court was allowing the policy in favor of ridding public roads of drunk
drivers to outweigh other concerns.
Policy is certainly not controlling. It is, however, persuasive in cases
that could go either way. Thus, even though a given situation does not
include all of the previously discussed reliability factors, when a situation
falls in the middle of the anonymous tip continuum, a court considering an
investigative stop based solely upon an anonymous tip alleging drunk
driving can and should uphold the stop due to social policy.
V. Conclusion
Whether an anonymous tip alleging drunk driving provides a responding
officer with reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify an investigative traffic
stop under the Fourth Amendment, absent prior independent corroboration
by the officer of the criminal allegations made in the tip, is a highly divisive
268. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 447 (upholding sobriety checkpoint stop in the face of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 554, 564
(1983) (upholding an implied consent law in the face of the Fifth Amendment); Montrym,
443 U.S. at 3-4, 19 (upholding an implied consent law in the face of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
269. See South Neville, 459 U.S. at 554; Montrym, 443 U.S. at 3.
270. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 456 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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issue. While the majority of courts that have considered the issue have held
that the anonymous tip alone is sufficient to justify such stops, the minority
position is that absent independent police corroboration, an anonymous tip,
by itself, is not enough to justify an investigative traffic stop under the
Fourth Amendment.
Although incorrect in couching its holding in dicta, the majority position
is correct in that the bulk of investigative stops based solely upon
anonymous tips alleging drunk driving are reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. The low level of invasiveness posed by the investigative
traffic stop in response to the anonymous tip alleging drunk driving sets a
low threshold in terms of indicia of reliability required of an anonymous tip
under the totality of the circumstances test. The anonymous tip alleging
drunk driving typically possesses relatively high indicia of reliability
because of several factors. Some factors are always present in the situation:
(1) anonymous tips are no longer truly “anonymous;” and (2) erratic driving
is a readily observable criminal action. While these factors alone will
usually not be enough, when other factors are present in a given situation,
the investigative stop in response to an anonymous tip alleging drunk
driving will typically be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, even
without prior independent corroboration. These factors include: (1) when a
tip comes from a firsthand observer; and (2) when a tip points an otherwise
clueless responding officer to the accused in a short amount of time.
Admittedly, not all investigative stops based solely upon anonymous tips
alleging drunk driving are constitutional under the Fourth Amendment.
When all of these factors come together in a given situation, however, the
low threshold required by the invasiveness of the investigative traffic stop
is more than met. This, combined with the governmental interest in ridding
roads of drunk drivers, makes the bulk of investigative traffic stops based
solely on anonymous tips alleging drunk driving reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment. Because of this, the majority of the time, the alleged
drunk driver should not be granted “one free swerve” prior to police being
able to pull the accused over for a quick check.
James Michael Scears

